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Abstract
This article investigates issues in psychosomatic medicine that could
broadly be seen as concerned with the status of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’
realms. Initially, it considers two seemingly opposing perspectives, the bio-
medical model and the constructivist/semiotic model. The bio-medical
model has all the set-backs of a positivistic and deterministic model: there
is an unambiguous reality that can be ascertained given a detailed enough
analysis. It furthermore assumes that observations can be explained by
the application of linear causal relationships between the single compo-
nents of reality. The constructivist perspective and the semiotic way of
thinking view life and individuals moving through their life as dealing with
particular signs; by applying semiotic thinking we understand why certain
elements were selected out of the environment and why they were given
a speciﬁc meaning. It suggests that some of the di‰culties arising from
these models can be ameliorated with reference to the neo-phenomenology
of Hermann Schmitz. In particular, the concept of the lived body (Leib)
assists in understanding the relationship between a patient and his envi-
ronment.
Keywords: medicine; psychosomatic; behavior; psychotherapy; psycho-
analysis; von Uexku¨ll.
In 1998 Uexku¨ll and Wesiack presented the third edition of their text-
book Theory of Human Medicine — in its 550 pages it attempts to por-
tray the basic thinking and clinical practice of physicians (von Uexku¨ll
and Wesiack 1998). The authors, particularly the recently deceased Thure
von Uexku¨ll, have tried to encourage their colleagues to think about the
model that forms the basis of their medical thinking and practice. If med-
icine could be described as the interaction of human beings with human
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beings then the main purpose of this model is the human conception of
medicine.
If one follows the critical thinking of Thure von Uexku¨ll, the main
problem with medicine is that it either propagates a medicine for bodies
without minds or a medicine for minds without bodies. In the introduc-
tion of the ﬁrst edition of his standard work Textbook of Psychosomatic
Medicine he wrote: ‘Somatic researchers quote Naunyn: ‘‘Medicine will
be science — or it will not be.’’ Psychosomatic researchers refer to Viktor
von Weizsa¨cker: ‘‘Psychosomatic medicine will be psychoanalysis — or it
will not be.’’ Medicine will . . . have to ﬁnd a synthesis for both’ (T. von
Uexku¨ll 1979).
1. A theory of psychosomatic medicine versus a theory of medicine
What should a theory of psychosomatic medicine achieve? Two ap-
proaches can be described through which an answer appears possible —
a salutogenetic and a pathogenetic approach.
From a salutogenetic perspective, according to Antonovsky, one could
argue that theories contribute to our lives by implanting a network of
meaningful concepts into the world we live in. They make the world
understandable and introduce a sense of coherence in the person who ap-
plies the theory. Antonovsky describes this as:
. . . a global orientation that expresses the extent to which one has a pervasive, en-
during though dynamic feeling of conﬁdence that one’s internal and external envi-
ronments are predictable and that there is a high probability that things will work
out as well as can reasonably be expected. (Sack and Lamprecht 1998)
This feeling of coherence is made up of three components, from which at
least the ﬁrst two can be supported by the knowledge and application of a
theory: comprehensibility (life events are predictable or at least classiﬁ-
able in a context) and manageability (the trust that demands can be met
with one’s own power), and meaningfulness (life events are viewed as de-
mands that are worth the e¤ort to solve them).
From a pathogenetic perspective one could ask: Which evil befalls
physicians or clinical researchers when they delve into ‘psychosomatic
problems’ or even into the realm of explanatory models in Psychosomatic
Medicine? The most likely cause is the experience of being unable to act
or to understand what is happening between the professional and the pa-
tient. Two examples can illustrate this:
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– A colleague from plastic surgery referred a 34-year-old man who des-
perately wanted a third operation on an inguinal hernia because he
was experiencing severe, mostly burning, pain in the area of the N.
cut. fem. lat. The patient engaged in endurance training, in swimming,
biking, and walking about ﬁve times a week for about 2–3 hours per
training session. The reason for the referral was the surgeon’s fear that
the situation could not be improved by yet another surgical procedure
(neurolysis).
– A general practitioner referred a 43-year-old patient whose inability to
work had not improved, even after two years of conversational ther-
apy (most likely in the sense of a patient-centred psychotherapy). The
patient reported periods of sti¤ness and pain in his trunk and leg
muscles lasting for hours, impaired vision, some dizziness, as well as
burning and tightness of the chest. During psychotherapy the doctor
had understood very well why the pain arose for the ﬁrst time two
years ago; unfortunately this alleviated the patient’s problems only
temporarily. The patient’s wife was now pregnant again and he was
worried about the family income. During the conversation a tense at-
mosphere arose, the therapist became uneasy and reacted very irritat-
edly and angrily to a knock on the door, although he had asked the
craftsman to report to him by all means before leaving.
In both instances colleagues were searching for help because their explan-
atory models were neither su‰cient for understanding the patient’s be-
havior nor helpful to present instructions on how to proceed. In both
instances an interest in psychosomatic thinking and action arose from
the experience of a deﬁciency in the implicitly available or consciously
applied models of either psychotherapy or somatic medicine.
In the development of a theory of medicine several problems should be
addressed. They were already persuasively formulated by Uexku¨ll and
Wesiack in the ﬁrst edition of the later so-called ‘Uexku¨ll — Textbook
of Psychosomatic Medicine’ (T. von Uexku¨ll 1979). In the ﬁrst chapter
the problems are formulated as follows:
1. We have seen that we may not regard the individual and the environment sepa-
rately. So we are presented with the problem of how their inter-relation can be
described in a concise concept in order to present doctors with detailed instruc-
tions for their diagnostic and therapeutic tasks.
2. Even if one successfully develops a language for the layer of social inter-
actions, the layer of physiological changes, and the layer of subjective per-
ception, the second problem lies in the creation of a model that is capable of
interpreting the connections between these three domains. (T. von Uexku¨ll
1979: 9)
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I might add:
3. Even if one manages to comprehend biological, psychological, and
social ﬁndings and to describe them in their respective languages,
even if a method for the analysis of their mutual relationship has
been created, there is still no answer to the pertinent question: Why
did this person fall ill at this moment?
A theory of psychosomatic medicine should not only provide explana-
tions regarding the experience of a patient and the process between doctor
and patient, but it should also be capable of alleviating the typical di-
lemma of psychosomatic physicians who report jumping back and forth
between the somatic and the psychosomatic world in their everyday clini-
cal practice. Many of these doctors avoid this problem by giving up their
somatic discipline and treating patients as psychotherapists only. Hence,
a further question emerges:
4. How can the change from a somatic identity, which is mainly rooted
in the bio-medical model, to a psychotherapeutic identity be de-
scribed and made useful?
2. A summary of the scientiﬁc theory of medicine
Most widely used is the scientiﬁc model of medicine that has been derived
primarily from physics. Nature sciences generate general statements,
which are put to the test through experiments. In order to obtain clear,
unequivocal results, the degrees of freedom of test animals and patients
must be restricted as much as possible. Data generated under ‘standard-
ized conditions’ allow for the construction of linear cause-e¤ect relation-
ships. From this perspective, humans behave like a trivial machine in
which every input (e.g., in the form of a pharmaceutical agent or an oper-
ative intervention) can be adequately assigned a carefully planned and
predictable output (e.g., lowering blood pressure or stabilization of
joints). Undoubtedly, this model has enabled enormous success, espe-
cially in emergency medicine or in diseases with a rapid onset and of short
duration. It is also clear, however, that chronic diseases and disorders
which arise from the behavior of individuals cannot successfully be ex-
plained or addressed through a purely scientiﬁc model. Wade and Halli-
gan (2004) described three assumptions that account for the limited use of
a purely bio-medical model: all illness has a single underlying cause, dis-
ease (pathology) is always the consequence of the single cause, and re-
moval or attenuation of the disease will result in a return to health. They
add the following as components of a reductionist model:
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– All diseases give rise to symptoms, eventually if not initially, and al-
though other factors may inﬂuence the consequences of disease, they
are not related to its development or manifestations
– Health is the absence of disease
– Mental phenomena, such as emotional disturbance or delusion, are
separate from and unrelated to other disturbance of bodily function
– The patient is a victim of circumstance with little or no responsibility
for the presence or cause of the illness
– The patient is a passive recipient of treatment, although cooperation
with treatment is expected.
3. Jakob von Uexku¨ll’s model of the functional cycle: The roots of
semiotic theory and constructivism
In order to answer the ﬁrst question, (How can the interplay of environ-
ment and individual be described in a concise concept?), Uexku¨ll and
Wesiack referred to the environmental theory of Jakob von Uexku¨ll.
The latter described the ‘functional cycle’ that governs the interaction be-
tween an organism and its environment.
From the multitude of di¤erent factors surrounding it, the organism
chooses elements that are relevant in the actual situation. In doing so, it
converts surrounding into environment, to which only those elements be-
long that are relevant at the present moment. The organism is thus em-
bedded in a ‘dwelling-integument’ that contains everything that is impor-
tant. With this perspective, J. von Uexku¨ll contradicted the dogma of a
positivist world view that assumes one single reality, uniform for di¤erent
organisms (J. von Uexku¨ll 1980). In the functional cycle a basic assump-
tion of constructivism is presumed: organisms construct their subjective
world by selecting some elements and by assigning a certain meaning
to these elements depending on their inner state. In the tradition of this
thinking, organisms create meaning — elements in the world ‘out there’
do not have an inherent meaning themselves.
The work of the Chilean biologist and cognitive scientist Humberto
Maturana has been very inﬂuential in the development of constructivist
approaches in psychosomatics (Maturana and Varela 1987). He created
the term ‘autopoietic organization’ as an important di¤erentiation be-
tween the living and the non-living (Maturana and Varela 1987). An au-
topoietic organization is an autonomous and self-maintaining unity that
contains component-producing processes. They perceive outer stimuli as
perturbation (disturbances) to their constantly ongoing inner process, to
which they react, depending on their momentary needs. Energy from the
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outside can shape the living system, but it cannot determine it. Even the
perception of senses such as sight and hearing are not an image of a
unique and deﬁnite reality around us, but individual constructions (Lan-
gewitz, Degen, and Scha¨chinger 2003: 754). This model has large-scale
consequences for medicine and psychosomatics, which mainly incorpo-
rates the following points:
A therapist cannot determine how his/her patient is seeing the world and
him/herself in this world only by observing him or her. A (partial) com-
mon reality must be constructed between a professional and a patient.
From this, the basics of communicative medicine can be derived because
doctor and patient must constantly agree on the momentarily valid ele-
ments of reality and on their signiﬁcance. One exception should be con-
sidered: in emergency medicine the elements of the common reality of
the doctor and the patient are usually immediately evident between the
two without further explication. Otherwise, the diversity of potential reac-
tions of an organism to di¤erent outer inﬂuences is unpredictable because
the individual’s inner state cannot be predicted with su‰cient precision.
The functional cycle contains core elements of a semiotic theoretical
approach: If not all elements in the environment of an individual are au-
tomatically part of his subjective world, they become so only after a basic
meaning has been attached to them: this and that is important at the mo-
ment (e.g., in a state of hunger), because it serves actual needs; moments
later this predicate is attached to other objects or situations. In a state of
hunger, fruit will be given the predicate of relevant and become part of
the subjective environment; eating it relieves hunger, and with satiety be-
ing achieved, a fruit loses its privilege of being relevant. This example il-
lustrates that we must be dealing with a two-step sign process: in the ﬁrst
step something is chosen as RELEVANT out of the diversity of the cues
surrounding us; in a second step this so called perception sign is assigned a
speciﬁc meaning; it initiates a behavior through which the organism sends
out an e¤ector sign into its environment (see ﬁgure 1). In simple cases
such as the case of the fruit in the presence of a hungry animal, the per-
ception sign disappears after the impact of the e¤ector sign (at least from
the externally visible environment): the e¤ector sign erased the perception
sign.
Although he does not describe his model of biology as semiotic, Jakob
von Uexku¨ll is known by his successors as the founder of the biosemiotic
perspective (Ho¤meyer 2003). The clinical signiﬁcance of the functional
cycle model can be illustrated well by the above mentioned example of
the sporty man:
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During their ﬁrst meeting the therapist notices that the patient touches or
even intensely massages the painful area on the side of his thigh several
times a minute. Most of the time, this gesture is accompanied by a facial
expression of pain. From a constructivist perspective we observe a pro-
cess of selection. Out of the manifold proprioceptive impressions, the
problem area is addressed; it is therefore very likely to become a domi-
nant part of the subjective reality of the patient. When the therapist in-
formed the patient about his observation he was surprised because he
had not intentionally touched this spot in his upper thigh. Therapist
and patient agreed upon the following description of their observations:
‘Without a conscious prompt, ‘‘the body’’ constantly produces new im-
pressions that yield conﬁrmatory evidence that something isn’t right in
that part of the body.’ The consequence of this automatic behavior is
that the problem area is never forgotten; it is forced into the foreground
of reality. When this process, in the sense of a self-perpetuating cycle, pre-
vents the intensity of the pain being reduced, it may be helpful to con-
sciously control and reduce the frequency of contact. Subsequently the
patient agreed that the therapist signals whenever he is touching the prob-
lem area in the remaining minutes of the session. He is surprised how
seldom he notices that ‘the ﬁngers of the right hand became active.’ He
decided to explain the situation to his partner and to have her help him
to become aware of his behavior more precisely. In the next session, he
Figure 1. Functional cycle according to Jakob v. Uexku¨ll
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reports that the intensity of the pain/discomfort has been reduced by
about 80 percent.
4. How does the interaction of biological, physical, and social factors
function?
The semiotic perspective in the discussion of the above drafted questions
in psychosomatic medicine seems attractive: under speciﬁc premises it of-
fers an answer to the second question: physical, social, and biological pro-
cesses and their interactions can be completely described in the terminol-
ogy of semiotics. This had been formulated in 1979 when T. von Uexku¨ll
and Wesiack saw the potential of semiotic thinking for a theory of
medicine:
Semiotics can gain a special importance in medicine — especially for psychoso-
matic medicine — by helping us to overcome the dichotomy of soma and psyche.
The basic di¤erence between (subjective) complaints and (objective) ﬁndings be-
comes irrelevant by the application of a theory of information. (T. von Uexku¨ll
1979: 78)
The works of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), who is described
by many as the father of modern semiotics, are considered important re-
sources for the semiotic position and have been consulted by Thure von
Uexku¨ll’s group. With reference to C. S. Peirce we must however keep in
mind that he addressed psychosomatic questions understood in today’s
terms only indirectly. We should therefore quote Peirce with the precau-
tion in mind, whether we indeed do him justice at all in quoting him in
relation to our psychosomatic models.
5. Semiotic thinking and C. S. Peirce
Jakob von Uexku¨ll formulated the inseparable connection of organisms
and their environment in the functional cycle. A central element therein
is the process of assigning meaning: After taking notice of it, an organism
interprets an element (sign) of its environment in a very speciﬁc manner
and then displays behavior according to the meaning which the sign
was given. One can describe this process very precisely in terms of C. S.
Peirce’s sign theory. Peirce added the interpretant in between the object
and the sign. According to a late phrasing from the year 1907:
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I will say that as a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates
between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object
relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the ob-
ject, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object
through the mediation of this ‘sign’ . . . The object and the interpretant are thus
merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent the other conse-
quent of the sign. (EP 2: 410)
This way of thinking makes Peirce attractive, ﬁrst of all, for the explana-
tion of diversity in patients’ behavior that often strikes clinicians treating
patients with seemingly similar states of disease; in spite of a similar ‘ob-
jective load’ and impairment, patients adapt to their illness in unpredict-
able and diverse ways. In Peirce’s terms, we might say that di¤erent ways
of adjusting arise from the formation of di¤erent interpretants that refer
to di¤erent objects or situations.
However, this straightforward application of Peirce’s taxonomy looses
its attractiveness or applicability to clinical situations if one tries to apply
precisely his complex list of signs, interpretants, objects, and relations be-
tween them. In that case, one soon feels like the editor of Peirce’s col-
lected works, who wrote in the introduction:
as anyone knows who has tried to work out examples of Peirce’s classes, it is not
as easy as we might think — which means either that we do not quite understand
Peirce or that this theory is a bit ambiguous. (Houser and Kloesel 1992: xxxvii)
Problematic for Peirce’s role as a source for the semiotic perspective in
psychosomatics is however, that many of his writings allow the assump-
tion that he restricted interpretants to those signs that develop distinctly
in the mind of the interpreter. If we assume that people’s behavior is gov-
erned by unconscious thoughts at least as much as by logical reasoning,
this position is di‰cult to accept. A further reason for scepticism from
the psychosomatic perspective is Peirce’s clear position regarding the de-
cisive role of the ﬁve senses that is best depicted in his famous dictum:
The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception
and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its
passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason. (EP
2: 241)
This reduces the human capability of perception to material that has un-
equivocally travelled along neuronal axes from sensory organs to the
brain. It denies human beings the ability to realize synesthetic characters
like paralyzing or solemn silence. How could a mere lack of acoustic
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phenomena (silence) bear these meanings? The above quotation from
Peirce does not o¤er a solution! However, there are other statements by
Peirce in the very same essay that soften the rigorous sensualistic reduc-
tion, according to Schmitz (1995: 21):
But the sum of it all is that our logically controlled thoughts compose a small part
of the mind, the mere blossom of a vast complexus which we may call the instinc-
tive mind in which this man will not say that he has faith because that implies the
conceivability of distrust, but upon which he builds as the very fact to which it is
the whole business of his logic to be true. (EP 2: 241)
In another part he emphasizes that a sign does not primarily cause a
logical interpretant (as a thought) in the consciously thinking ‘mind,’
but that it initially causes feelings. They present a ﬁrst impression of
the meaning of a sign (the emotional interpretant). Furthermore, a sign
should cause an impulse (e¤ort); he calls these interpretants the energetic
interpretants (EP 2: 409).
6. Peirce’s triadic semiotics and its clinical application
The term triadic semiotics describes the trinity of semiotics, which is cate-
gorized into object-sign-interpretant and distinguishes Peirce’s semiotics
from the semiotics of de Saussure, which di¤erentiates between ‘signiﬁant’
and ‘signiﬁe´,’ and is based on a two-sided sign process. ‘Le signiﬁant’ de-
scribes the form that a sign assumes and ‘le signiﬁe´’ the concept that it
represents. The relationship between the two is explained as signiﬁcation
(Saussure 1983 [1916]: 67). A further case study might help to demon-
strate why a triadic semiotic perspective, according to Peirce, can be use-
ful for a therapeutic process:
A patient reports recurrent phases of acute shortness of breath, for which no biolog-
ical reason has been found. The problem started during a ENT-examination, during
which she suddenly resisted the ENT-doctor who held her tongue and had pulled it
out in order to inspect her vocal chords. Because no one could tell where the short-
ness of breath came from, she ended up in a psychosomatic outpatient department.
ECG, X-rays of the lungs, lung function tests, etc. had yielded normal results.
In an attempt to translate this situation into a triadic sign system, it is ev-
ident that the deﬁnition of a starting process of a semiosis is an arbitrary
decision. We are confronted with chains of signs, interpretants, and ob-
jects. In this case report we might choose to start with the fact that she
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opened her mouth wide in the presence of a doctor (male?). Translating
this into a semiosis we might say:
‘It seems that the fact that Dr. X asked you to open your mouth put you in a state of
agitation with very unpleasant feelings. It caused the immediate wish to get out of
the situation.’
Or: opening the mouth acts as a sign, which elicits an obviously negative
emotional interpretant and a strong energetic interpretant; both refer to
an unknown situation/an unknown object. In Peirce’s notation one could
write:
aObject/Situation: UNKNOWNaSign: ‘Open your mouth!’aEnergetic interpretant: Go away!aEmotional interpretant: Fear!
The patient thinks about this proposal and then adds: ‘I think it has something to do
with the fact that he was sitting so close to me, his knees in between mine.’
‘So it is a combination of opening your mouth and the physical proximity to a
man that triggers this uncomfortable situation? Even if you cannot recall what is
loading this encounter with so much meaning we are left with some knowledge: there
must have been a situation in which such a combination of signs elicited similar in-
terpretants. What we also know is that this situation somehow developed into short-
ness of breath.’
The patient takes up the term ‘shortness of breath’ and during the next
three meetings the therapy centres around recognition and avoidance of
hyperventilation. Practicing breathing exercises (breath holding, relaxed
breathing, panting, humming) she remembers that her two older brothers
used to play a game with her: all three threw their blankets on their par-
ents’ large bed, they all jumped on top and somehow rolled around under
and between the di¤erent layers. If they got hold of someone else they
tried to tickle the other who tried to escape into another layer of blankets.
Sometimes she ended up in the bottom layer and was afraid she might
su¤ocate. She then fought like mad to free herself.
Here, an individual history can be reconstructed for at least one inter-
pretant: There was a situation in which the desperate urge to ‘break free’
(energetic interpretant) arose from the perception of not being able to
breathe (sign), which was (probably) related to an increased pCO2 level
(object/situation).
Afterwards the patient reported that she tends to overuse anti-congestants when she
has caught a cold; for years she has always tried to avoid the sensation of restricted
breathing through her nose.
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In the fourth meeting she mentioned a trip to the dentist with her son in the preced-
ing week. She suddenly had realized that there had been something during her child-
hood that she would like to talk about now. In tears and with heavy breathing she is
relating to a series of treatments at the age of 6 or 7. She remembers the dentist
pressing up against her arm on the armrest of the dentist chair; she does not recall
whether anything ‘real happened.’ She just re-experienced the sense of helplessness
and disorientation, not knowing what exactly was going on, sensing however that
something was not as it should be.
The origin of a further interpretant became clear with this story: The fear
of a young girl (emotional interpretant) was triggered by the combination
of her mouth being locked open and the physical closeness of a man
(sign), which refers to the abuse of a professional relationship in her life
history (situation/object).
One might ask whether thinking in Peircean categories allows for such
reasoning. I think this attempt to rebuild the past situation surrounding
actual interpretants is justiﬁed; in a letter to William James from the year
1909, Peirce clariﬁed that a sign determines a potential Mind only when
this mind possesses additional information concerning the object. He
wrote:
A person who says Napoleon was a lethargic creature has evidently his mind de-
termined by Napoleon. For otherwise he could not attend to him at all. But here
is a paradoxical circumstance. The person who interprets that sentence (or any
other Sign whatsoever) must be determined by the Object of it through collateral
observation quite independently of the action of the Sign. Otherwise he will not be
determined to [the] thought of that object. If he never heard of Napoleon before,
the sentence will mean no more to him than some person or thing to which the
name ‘Napoleon’ has been attached was a lethargic creature. (EP 2: 493)
The same holds for the interpretant; he also has a history in which collat-
eral observations were collected (EP 2: 494–495).
7. Peirce’s semiotic and its use as an integrative perspective for di¤erent
psychotherapeutic trends
In my opinion, a semiotic perspective could contribute to the explana-
tion of basic similarities in di¤erent psychotherapeutic models: if we as-
sume that prior experiences a¤ect our interpretation of the momentary
environment — not only in the assessment of what we perceive, but also
in the choice of what we perceive — then the material being dealt with,
for example, in psychoanalysis and behavior therapy, shares one element
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in common: an attempt to reconstruct the development of interpretants.
The main di¤erence would then be due to di¤erent timelines that are ap-
plied in the attempt to understand current interpretants and signs. The
typical behavioral therapist would ask: ‘When precisely was the last time
you experienced this problem? Could you accurately explain the situation
to me?,’ while the psychodynamic therapist, after the description of the
patient’s problem, will be more interested in whether or not something
similar happened in the past going back to the patients’ childhood. Addi-
tionally, according to Peirce, one could easily assume that the isolation
of interpretants on a purely cognitive level does not make much sense —
e¤ort and feeling are almost always present before the actual thoughts.
The more cognitive behavioral therapy acknowledges that even non-
conscious signs can trigger interpretants, the more the dispute between
the representatives of di¤erent therapeutic schools could focus on the ef-
fective ingredients of psychotherapy — for example, on the question of
how important trust in the good intentions of the therapist is, etc.
For psychosomatic thinking and psychosomatic therapy in general, one
might think about the question to what extent therapeutic intervention
should be seen as ‘working on interpretants.’ This is explicitly the goal of
cognitive behavior therapy when their supporters talk about dysfunc-
tional concepts, reframing concepts, etc. All these terms can be directly
translated into ‘working on the interpretant.’
8. Peirce’s world of the unknown
What must happen for humans to decide to seek medical help? If we dis-
regard acute injuries or other emergency situations like a sudden collapse
or inability to breathe, humans perceive something that just tells them:
‘something is ‘‘not good’’ ’! If someone presents this vague sensation of
‘not good’ to a physician, s/he will be confronted with a list of closed
questions that ask for a meticulous description of the problem. According
to Peirce this vague and miscellaneous state belongs to the category of
Firstness. He calls signs within ﬁrstness iconic signs. His description of
Firstness is as follows:
The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying
behind anything . . . The First must therefore be present and immediate so as not
to be second to a representation. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and
free; . . . it cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its char-
acteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop
to think of it, and it has ﬂown! . . . Only remember that every description of it
must be false to it. (EP 1: 248)
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The fact that Peirce’s signs of Firstness are ultimately inaccessible for a
discourse makes them di‰cult for an inclusion in a theory of psychoso-
matic medicine. We know of their existence, but do not perceive them
clearly; we might become aware of them in the no man’s land just before
being fully awake. Peirce gives a vivid example of these phenomena in the
story of a man, whose bed clothes catch ﬁre (EP 1: 283). We forget signs
of ﬁrstness as soon as we are able to separate them out from the sur-
rounding signs as being unique.
Freud has pointed to the paramount importance of vague perceptions.
He recommends that the psychoanalytical therapist dedicates himself to
the indeﬁnite and to consider everything that he comes in contact with
the same serious interest. In his ‘Recommendations to physicians practis-
ing psychoanalysis,’ he wrote:
However, this technique is a very simple one. It rejects all kinds of technical aids
. . . even taking notes. It simply consists of an attitude of abstaining from remem-
bering speciﬁc elements of what is said. Foremost is the willingness to meet what
so ever is brought up with evenly sustained but free-ﬂoating attention. On the
other hand, as soon as one deliberately strains attention to a signiﬁcant extent,
one starts to actively select from among the material being presented. (Freud
1912: 376)
9. Hermann Schmitz’ neo-phenomenology
I would like to brieﬂy present Hermann Schmitz’s neo-phenomenology as
a third theoretical reference. From my understanding, his theory stems
from the deﬁcits of the two other models: the bio-medical model has all
the set-backs of a positivistic and deterministic model: there is an unam-
biguous reality that can be ascertained given a detailed enough analysis. It
furthermore assumes that observations can be explained by the applica-
tion of linear causal relationships between the single components of real-
ity. The constructivist perspective and the semiotic way of thinking view
life and individuals moving through their life as dealing with particular
signs; by applying semiotic thinking we understand why certain elements
were selected out of the environment and why they were given a speciﬁc
meaning.
The examples above however, might also have shown that this type of
post hoc semiotic interpretation of an interaction between patient and
therapist is far away from the actual experience of patient and therapist.
This however — experiences that ‘on the average everybody can vividly
access or retrieve from his memory’ is the basis for the philosophical rea-
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soning of Hermann Schmitz’s (b. 1928), who laid down his system of phi-
losophy in a ten volume oeuvre. Schmitz clearly rejects the semiotic posi-
tion, in which primarily polyvalent or non-meaningful signs receive their
meaning in the mind of an observer. He contradicts the assumption that
‘subjects who are positioned opposite to the world are projecting meaning
into a world that primarily is indi¤erent’ (Schmitz 1997: 186). Particular
items can only be distinguished if they belong to a certain category.
Meaning is therefore primarily present and not the result of an attribution
by the interpreter of a situation (Schmitz Marx, and Moldzio 2002: 63).
Except for a state of trance or ecstasy ‘Everything that is distinctly expe-
rienced, and everything that is single in the sense that the number of a
category increases by one, is (already) charged with meaning’ (Schmitz
2003: 89). It would, however, be impossible for humans to move through
a world of myriad particular items that are already loaded with meaning.
This was no problem for Jakob von Uexku¨ll because he believed that
the organism does not move through a barrage of meaningful signs, but
through a world mainly consisting of dimensionless and meaningless
particles from which certain ones are chosen and become part of the sub-
jective environment. In the functional cycle and according to Peirce, it is
however not clear how a sign moves into the foreground of perception so
that it is being noticed and initiates a semiosis. Doesn’t this call for a cer-
tain meaning sui generis? At least a meaning like: ‘Take notice of me? Pay
attention!’ Posed like this the question of how signs — including inner
bodily perceptions — manage to get a box seat in the patient’s mind is
of great importance in psychosomatic medicine: how does, for example,
an almost subliminal perception of vertigo become so important that
it keeps the perceiving individual with a somatoform disorder from leav-
ing home? Eco discovered a similar ‘pointing’ characteristic of signs in
Peirce’s term ‘ground,’ which they possess before referring to the process
of semiosis of the actual object (Eco 2000: 126).
Schmitz’ thinking takes another direction: If the world would indeed
consist of myriad elements that all have a circumscribed meaning, we
would loose orientation in a whirlwind of details. This does not happen,
however, because we normally live embedded in situations and not in con-
stellations. Situations are characterized by a uniﬁed entity (Gestalt) that
stands out from the environment, meaningfulness consisting of facts,
programmes, and problems; situations have ‘something to say’; di¤usion
within the situation: not everything contained can be listed as single items;
meaningfulness is dissolved in chaotic manifoldness (Schmitz 1999: 21).
Our own language is a typical situation: we move through our mother
tongue without paying attention to precise rules or to the etymological
derivation of a term that we are using. Learning a foreign language takes
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place inside of a constellation. Constellations are (complex) arrangements
of particular items that can ﬁnally be understood.
The following few terms, which have been taken out of Schmitz’s work,
could in my opinion be helpful for the development of theories in psycho-
somatic medicine. Again, as with Peirce: it is risky to excise single compo-
nents out of a complex work and transfer them into another theory. Us-
ing Schmitz’ terms we may hope that the basic character of the meaning
is maintained, while certainly some of the precision of the term intended
by the author is lost; Schmitz decidedly commented on medical and psy-
chotherapeutic problems, he set out a comprehensive theory of the felt
body and wrote about human communication (see Langewitz 2007 and
Schmitz 2004a).
Hermann Schmitz critically distances himself from the philosophical
tradition of the Western world, which has had a major impact upon re-
search paradigms in natural sciences, as well. He traces back the roots of
Western philosophy to Democritus,
who was the ﬁrst to propose a division of the human being into body and mind;
mind being viewed as a closed, private inner world, similar to a house, with the
senses as the only witnesses of the world outside. This leaves behind a reduced
outer world, in which according to Aristotle there are only three types of charac-
teristics (Substance, Matter, Form) which have atoms as their carriers. (Schmitz
2004a: 148)
Di¤erent things arise from the (re-) arrangement of atoms much like tragedies and
comedies contain the same characters. This view is the emblem of constellation-
ism: The world (at least the outer world) is seen as a constellation of (enmeshed)
single items just like a text is a constellation of letters. (Schmitz 2004a: 148)
With this principle in mind it is only logical that natural sciences continue
looking for smaller entities within the bio-medical model; applications of
nano-technology or the Human Genome Project could be viewed as being
driven by the assumption that, in the end, life and most diseases could be
described as the (false) arrangement of observable units in a deterministic
model.
10. Feelings as atmospheres poured out rimless
We all have had the experience of a room ﬁlled with a certain atmo-
sphere; we realize immediately if ‘trouble is brewing’ even if we do not
know the individuals sitting together nor what they have been talking
about (Schmitz 1995: 292). This familiar observation is used by Schmitz
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to argue against the exclusively private nature of feelings; they are by
no means locked in ‘the soul’ of a person, accessible only through the
intimacy of a dyad or of a therapeutic group. It does not take speciﬁc ut-
terances (crying, screaming, quirking eyebrows); even a room with no hu-
man being in it can breathe a certain atmosphere. How do feelings as at-
mospheres exert their power over human beings? Schmitz explains this
phenomenon by stating that feelings cause a reaction of the felt body
(German: Leib), sometimes taking possession of the a¤ected person com-
pletely (Schmitz 1995: 302).
11. Communication as the interaction of lived bodies (leibliche
Kommunikation)
With this term, Schmitz describes the characteristics of any type of inter-
action that ‘overcomes the loneliness of an individual.’ Contrary to the se-
miotic position set out above, the individual and the environment cannot
be thought of as being separate, in opposition to one another, nor could
they be imagined as communicating via the exchange of information, for
example via impulses travelling along the optical or the acoustic nerves.
Schmitz uses the term felt body (Leib) to make a distinction from the
body (Ko¨rper) the extension of which can be identiﬁed through the senses
like touch or optical representation. The felt body refers to the sensations
one has in the region of the body (Ko¨rper) without the use of eyes or
hands. The di¤use sensation of ‘not doing well,’ reported by a patient
above is a phenomenon of the felt body that upon presentation to a
physician immediately gets transformed into a bodily (ko¨rperlich) phe-
nomenon within the realm of single distinctive ﬁndings. The interaction
of lived bodies occurs even without explicit agreement: it explains why
people can pass one another, without much conﬂict, on a shopping mall
just before Thanksgiving, loaded with shopping bags. Bodily communica-
tion also includes the interaction with inanimate objects: the smart avoid-
ance of a mass that is rushing towards us threatening physical integrity
like a car being on the wrong side of the road is another example of
‘bodily communication.’
12. Switching between a somatic and a psychosomatic identity
Physicians who engage in psychosomatic medicine, at least in German
speaking countries, are not necessarily psychiatrists, but rather qualiﬁed
primarily in a somatic specialization like internal medicine or gynecology
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— often with an additional qualiﬁcation in psychotherapy. In daily prac-
tice they constantly have to strike a balance between the realm of the un-
certain and of subjective facts, which can at best be articulated on one’s
own behalf, and the realm of objective facts, which everyone can articu-
late as long as he is knowledgeable enough and able to express himself
su‰ciently (Langewitz 2008; Schmitz 2003: 15).
I propose that this transition could best be described by Schmitz’ termi-
nology: As soon as concrete action is to be taken, particular items like a
pleural e¤usion or suicidal thoughts (objective facts) must be scooped out
of the vaguely dispersed meaning of a situation. The same holds for estab-
lished programs that might pre-exist in the patient’s or the physician’s
stock of similar situations. Talking within a so deﬁned constellation re-
quires analytical intelligence; it explains prosaically. The rest of the situa-
tion is discarded as something that (at the moment) does not matter
(Schmitz 2004b: 227). Physicians are well trained to leave a situation with
vaguely dispersed meaning and to enter a constellation: most medical
teachers at university demonstrate their proﬁciency by rapidly extracting
particular items out of the di¤use description of a patient’s su¤ering. The
more brilliant they are the faster they ask the one decisive question like:
‘Have you been to the tropics in the last year?,’ or the faster they perform
the one single physical examination like the palpation of the spleen. They
demonstrate that there is always a short-cut to the correct diagnosis and
thus prove the utility not only of working within constellations but also of
the reductionist biomedical model in general. Students normally are not
aware of the fact that other doctors — ﬁrst of all the family doctor —
have already ‘purged’ the situation of other meaningful components.
In the many instances in medicine when immediate action is not neces-
sary or when it is not clear how the situation will develop, another type of
intelligence is needed. Schmitz describes this kind of intelligence as her-
meneutic intelligence, explaining the world poetically:
Like a poet, hermeneutic intelligence is weaving a loose-ﬁtting net of explanations
around the phenomenon to be described. The whole, vaguely distributed meaning
is not made explicit but so-to-say shining through the meshes of the net. (Schmitz
2004b: 227)
Embedded in a mutual situation, using poetic explication, a physician
cannot extract single observations. In that case, instructions for concrete
action are di‰cult to obtain; the conversation remains open for develop-
ment in all possible directions, until, with the help of a prosaic explica-
tion, particular problems are speciﬁed for which particular solutions
(programs) can be o¤ered.
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13. What leads to illness — the loss of adaptation (Passung)?
In the introduction to the ﬁrst chapter of the ﬁrst edition of the textbook
(1979), Uexku¨ll and Wesiack presented a preliminary answer to this last
question: ‘We have established that an organism becomes ill, when it enters
a situation that it cannot handle.’ For psychosomatic theory, the under-
standing of feelings as atmospheres poured out rimless and the concept
of communication as the interaction of two or more lived bodies is prom-
ising because these deﬁnitions o¤er an understanding of a central term in
the writings of von Uexku¨ll. It is the term Passung probably best trans-
lated as adaptation. In the book Theory of Human Medicine, adaptation
between organisms and environment is considered a prerequisite for life
in general, down to the level of a single cell (von Uexku¨ll and Wesiack
1998: 370). Following these lines of thinking, adaptation occurs when
the environment helpfully accommodates the intentions of the organism,
providing water to the movement of ﬁns and wind to the feathers of a
bird’s wings. In that sense, adaptation is central to living: whoever loses
the competence of adapting to the environment, falls ill (Adler et al. 2003:
1365). In spite of its centrality in the thinking of Uexku¨ll and Wesiack,
the term remains amazingly pallid and unclear, even though, in my opin-
ion, the contributions converge with coping-research, research about the
terms of development of illness among migrants, integrative achievements
in relation to social, bodily, and psychological circumstances, etc. Maybe
the reference to Schmitz could further assist in the understanding of the
concept. Both Uexku¨ll and Wesiack and Schmitz, when referring to the
topic of mutual physical adaptation, cite experiments from the 1940s:
how two people who are both pulling at separate ends of a saw organize
their teamwork (Christian and Haas 1949). Technically, the task is ex-
tremely di‰cult: it is not just a change from ‘pull’ to ‘let go/be pulled,’
because the blade would twist if there isn’t enough resistance from the
more passive collaborator. To add pain to misery, the amount of resis-
tance depends on the structure of the wood, on the strength of the one
who pulls, on the quality of the saw, on the angle of the blade relative to
the two persons, etc. Given this extremely complicated interaction, I see
no likely biomedical model that explains why the task of cutting a trunk
down can successfully be accomplished by two lay persons. Do they ex-
change subliminal ‘signs’ that elicit interpretants that in turn point to the
state of the blade relative to the wood? Instead of seeking an explanation
within the realm of particular items, Schmitz explains this instantaneous
cooperation without delay with the fact that the cooperative partners
become quasi-one through a mutual embodiment in which body refers to
the lived body and not the assembly of muscles and sinews (Schmitz 1995:
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137). The basic idea behind this concept of communication between lived
bodies includes the concept of a vital drive. Vital drive refers to an innate
vitality of living organisms that is not necessarily conﬁned to the region of
an individual body; it can encompass a group of individuals singing in a
choir or spectators in a stadium who are raised or pulled down by an up-
ﬂare or a decrease of vital energy in their common felt body shared by all
individuals under the glass cover of an atmosphere (Schmitz 2003: 38).
The emotional disruption of resonance between a therapist and a depres-
sive patient is understood as a loss of the ability of the patient’s vital drive
to adapt to an a¤ection of the felt body that indicates the impact of an
atmosphere (Schmitz 1995: 128).
Communication as the interaction of lived bodies, leading to successful
mutual adaptation could be seen as underlying di¤erent phenomena that
are familiar to most clinicians:
– the ﬂash phenomenon of a sudden deep understanding in the doctor-
patient-relationship as described by Balint et al. (1975: 126)
– the moment when patients and relatives suddenly sense trust and de-
cline any further explanation prior to a surgical procedure
– the physical relief described by Peirce upon a successful sudden ab-
duction: But suddenly when we are poring over our digest of the facts
endeavouring to set them into order, it occurs to us that if we were to
assume something to be true that we not know to be true, these facts
would arrange themselves luminously (EP 2: 531).
14. Conclusion
It is hoped that human medicine beneﬁts from a discussion between rep-
resentatives of di¤erent research paradigms and philosophical traditions.
Constructivism has the potential to force the physician trained in the
application of the bio-medical model to take into account the individual
patient and to acknowledge the unpredictability of his or her behavior.
Semiotics, especially biosemiotics, o¤er a terminology that might help to
bridge the gap between processes of the body and the mind; from interac-
tion between cells to the interaction between the individual and the envi-
ronment, life could be seen as the exchange of signs (information). Her-
mann Schmitz’s new phenomenology o¤ers access to a less well deﬁned
world without clearly distinguishable particular items.
The object of medicine — the interaction of human beings with human
beings — is possibly too complex to be understood by just one model.
What von Uexku¨ll wrote in the introduction to his textbook in 1979, in
my view is valid for all attempts of deﬁning a theory of medicine:
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A textbook which attempts to describe a developing object should not hesitate to
accept its temporary nature and welcome heterogeneous points of view from all
parts of the intellectual world. (T. von Uexku¨ll 1979)
Note
* I give special thanks to Prof. Walter Burger from Berlin who, as a cautious pathﬁnder,
led me through the world of Schmitz and gave me valuable references to one of the ﬁrst
versions of this article and Alex von Sinner from Basel who served as my semiotic
chaperone.
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